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A criminal proceeding has been suspended by a Hungarian justice of the Pest
Central District Court to ask the European Court of Justice (ECJ) preliminary
questions, inter alia, about his own judicial independence. Now, Hungary’s Supreme
Court has stepped in and ruled that the reference was illegal, essentially arguing that
preliminary references are not the fora to discuss such claims. In fact, however, this
preliminary reference reveals that all other means to effectively challenge the rule of
law backsliding in Hungary have failed.
The Kúria’s judgment and its likely effects
The Prosecutor General exercised his right to initiate a review of the order for the
preliminary reference (press release in original language here). In its motion of 19
July 2019, the Prosecutor General argued that the first question is irrelevant, since
the quality of translation did not come up in the case at hand, while the second and
third questions are not about the interpretation of EU law, furthermore they are too
remote from the case, as they do not influence its outcome. The Prosecutor General
therefore requested the Supreme Court (in Hungarian: Kúria) to deem the reference
unlawful.
On 10 September 2019, the Kúria delivered its judgment No. Bt.838/2019. In these
types of procedures, the Kúria may determine that the challenged decision was
illegal. When no substantive judgment was rendered in the original proceeding,
this is all the Kúria can do, without attaching any legal consequences to such a
determination, according to Article 669(3) of the Hungarian Criminal Procedural
Code. Since no decision on guilt or punishment was taken when the request for a
preliminary reference was issued in the case at hand, the Kúria could only determine
illegality in a declaratory judgment.
In its judgment the Kúria agreed with the Prosecutor General without reservations
and held that suspension of a criminal case and a request for preliminary ruling is
illegal, if the subject matter of the request is not the interpretation or validity of EU
law, but concerns questions irrelevant from the viewpoint of the outcome of the
pending case. According to the Kúria, the objective of preliminary ruling procedures
is the unified interpretation and application of EU law and not the theoretical
assessment of a Member State’s constitutional structure and legal system. In a
clear reference to the referring judge’s labor law disputes with the judiciary and the
disturbed relation between the National Judicial Office and its supervisory organ,
the National Judicial Council (the Hungarian judiciary’s self-governing body), the
press release also emphasized that procedural acts must not be abused either for
real or perceived individual injuries, or for the realisation of institutional interests.
As if responding to expected criticism, during the oral hearing (summary here), the
Kúria stated that they only wish to protect the unity of the Hungarian case-law, and
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the judgment does not jeopardise the inalienable right of Hungarian judges to turn
to the ECJ in the form of preliminary references. The judgment has indeed no legal,
but a chilling effect. It cannot prevent the procedure from unfolding, but it can prevent
other judges from referring similar questions to the ECJ.
Futile procedures in case of doubts concerning
judicial independence
Leaving aside the psychological effects of the ruling on the propensity of judges to
refer cases to Luxembourg, one could ask whether the Kúria’s – not so hidden –
message is justified. It essentially claims that the case is only used and abused to
offer a critique of Hungarian constitutional changes/capture, and that preliminary
references are not the fora to discuss such claims.
Well, the case is certainly not what it seems to be. It is peculiar in many aspects.
First it is unusual enough that a judge asks the Luxembourg court whether he –
as a member of a captured judiciary – is independent enough to pass a judgment.
Second, it is somewhat puzzling that the attorney of the defendant puts forward
a request of suspension of the process. His main concern was – as stated during
the court hearing in the original case – that the Hungarian judgment would not be
acknowledged by foreign courts due to the irregularities in relation to procedural
guarantees and violations of judicial independence. It is perplexing to hear this from
an attorney because – however counterintuitive it may sound – his client would
only benefit from non-recognition. Should the accused be found guilty and should
the sentence not be recognised by a foreign court, the convict would only profit.
If, however, he were exonerated by the Hungarian court, such a judgment would
need to be recognised by any foreign court, due to the principle of ne bis in idem. So
again, the convict would benefit.
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the attorney was indeed motivated by concerns
regarding mutual recognition, as he claimed. What is more likely is that he was
worried that procedural issues and court capture in the domestic setting would
violate his client’s individual rights. But it is even more likely that the attorney and the
national judge were concerned about the dire state of human rights and the rule of
law in Hungary in general. If this is indeed the case, the preliminary reference in a
criminal case is not the procedure to use. So let us see what other avenues would
have been available and why they were not taken.
(i) One possibility within the domestic setting would be to file a claim before the
Hungarian Constitutional Court. This institution however has been captured by the
government, and is not in the position to rule on a delicate matter involving judicial
independence or separation of powers (see for example here, here, or here).
(ii) There are also European avenues to discuss the state of the rule of law. Article
7 TEU procedures are the obvious path to challenge pressure by the executive on
the judiciary in a Member State. But such a procedure has only been triggered twice
in EU history, and none of the processes came to an end. Given the immense harm
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that can be done until such a procedure determines state responsibility (if such a
decision is ever rendered), Article 7 TEU cannot be seen as an efficient tool.
(iii) An infringement procedure is the next option, which can be invoked if a Member
State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties. There is established case
law on the importance of judicial independence for the whole European project,
underpinned by specific Treaty provisions, such as Article 2 TEU on the founding
values the EU, Article 4 Section (3) TEU on the principle of sincere cooperation,
and importantly Article 19 Section (1) on the obligation to provide national remedies
for effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law. In the Case C-64/16
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses the ECJ held that every Member State
has to ensure that national courts must meet the requirements of effective judicial
protection, which is only possible if judicial independence is maintained. In C-619/18
Commission v. Poland on the forced early retirement of judges, the ECJ held that
the effective judicial protection of individuals as laid down in Article 19(1) TEU is
a general principle of EU law and that an absence of an implemented EU law is
irrelevant for it to be invoked, in view of the fact that this provision refers to the “fields
covered by Union law”. After having clarified matters on applicability and scope of
EU law, the ECJ held that judicial independence requires that national rules must
be designed in such a way that judges are protected from temptations to give in
to external intervention or pressure, whether such influences are direct or indirect.
Despite the case law and the strong black letter law on judicial independence,
neither the Commission, nor another Member State have made the first steps
to expose the capture of the Hungarian court system.1)To be precise, the ECJ
ruled in Case C-268/12 Commission v. Hungary on the forced early retirement of
Hungarian judges back in 2012, but at that time the case was (mis)construed as an
age discrimination case, and the remedies did not contribute to undoing the harm
and could not prevent judicial capture. The case law has changed considerably since
then, and several other changes in the Hungarian laws on the judiciary could have
been attacked, nevertheless no infringement proceedings have been started.
(iv) Finally, there is the preliminary ruling procedure as a tool to discuss systemic
rule of law backsliding. Polish judges make attempts to use this type of procedure
(here is a summary of all Polish preliminary references tackling rule of law
backsliding, by courtesy of Laurent Pech) and the first AG Opinion is promising. But
these cases are originating from disputes where the judges are themselves parties to
the cases, challenging the rules applicable to them.
In cases involving mutual recognition of criminal judgments, the ECJ allows for a
general suspension of mutual recognition only when a Member State has been
sanctioned in line with Article 7 TEU, which has never happened in EU history yet.
Or, according to the case-law, mutual recognition can be suspended in individual
cases, where a two-prong-test is satisfied: after having determined that there were
general deficiencies in an issuing country with regard to human rights or the rule
of law, the defendant has to prove that in the case at hand s/he is individually
concerned by the generic problems (joined Cases C#404/15 and C#659/15 PPU,
Aranyosi and C#ld#raru, later reaffirmed in Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice
and Equality v LM). As we have argued earlier on this blog, the second prong of
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the test places Herculean hurdles on the suspect or the convict, as it is close to
impossible to show the individual concern.
A case of desperation
The preliminary reference in the Hungarian case should never have been submitted,
and certainly not in that form. The fact that it was, shows that all domestic channels
which were supposed to operate as checks on the government were weakened
and/or institutions were packed by government-friendly persons. At the same time
external mechanisms to sanction rule of law backsliding were also un- or underused.
The EU remained silent during the long years when a poisonous climate within
Hungarian courts escalated and the judiciary was being captured. This is so despite
the fact that “the EU’s toolbox of measures to support and correct for rule of law
rot is already sufficiently comprehensive and sophisticated in nature to, at the very
least, contain rule of law backsliding if the full set of current instruments is used
promptly, forcefully and in a coordinated manner”. But it isn’t. As Dimitry Kochenov
put it, the EU is “failing the main promise the new Member States hoped the EU
would keep, i.e. to protect the new democracies from their own failures and deadly
temptations”, and is “co-responsible for the ongoing rule of law failures, [when it]
supports autocracies financially, institutionally and politically”. And by failing to act
and use exiting instruments to their full potential, let me also add: “legally”.
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